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Introduction 
 
This is not the first time that attention has been drawn to the fact that fear of crime 
surveyors typically include in their questionnaires a set of questions that ask 
respondents how likely each thinks it is that they will become a victim of one or other 
named crimes in the subsequent year (Ditton & Chadee, 2006). In the UK, questions 
like this were first tried in the British Crime Survey because one of the original 
designers wished to contrast what he referred to as “actual and perceived risks”.4 
 
The idea that actual (or objective) risks can be compared with perceived (or 
subjective) risks is both well established and, by many, staunchly defended. One thing 
is unarguably true, as we shall see, and that is that far more people believe that they 
will become a future victim of a nominated offence than, in fact, transpire to become 
so.  
 
A problem emerges for those who suspect that there is something amiss here, and that, 
looked at in this way, there is accordingly “too much” perceived risk. Indeed, this is 
an important issue as reducing perceived risk to levels that match objective reality (as 
measured by police recorded or survey collected victimisation rates) has become a 
cornerstone of UK government crime control policy (the National Reassurance 
Policing Programme) in which substantial public funds have been invested.  
 
However, it isn’t clear in what sense perceived risk should be reduced. Is it that many 
people should reduce their subjective risk rating a little, or that a few people should 
reduce it a lot? This is an important yet typically unaddressed issue. The conventional 
view is that there is too much perceived risk is perhaps illustrated by row 6 of Table 3 
(below). Here, between 42% and 45% of Trinidadians believe that they are “likely” or 
“very likely” to be murdered in the following 12 months at each of three times the 
sample was questioned. About 0.0001% of Trinidadians are actually murdered every 
year.5  
 
In standard recoding, those perceiving the risk to be “very likely” are added to those 
perceiving it to be “likely”, and those perceiving the risk to be “very unlikely” are 
added to those perceiving it to be “unlikely”. There isn’t much point in policy 
persuading the “very likelys” to become “likelys” as this won’t affect the result 
(although if perceived risk reduction is the goal, this would be a significant if 
unrewarded achievement). To be a noticeable effect, unfeasibly large numbers of 
“likelys” must be persuaded to become “unlikelys”. 
 
In addition, a moral issue may be of concern. Maybe the frequency of murder is so 
low in Trinidad because the perception that is likely is held by so many. Possibly, the 
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  Michael Hough, personal communication. 
5
  In 1999, 120 murders were recorded by the police in Trinidad. Trinidad has a population of 1.3 
million. To put this in context, in 1999 585,000 Trinidadians thought it likely that they would be 
murdered. It happened to 120. So, 99.8% of those expecting to die were cruelly disappointed. People’s 
attitudes to murder are just an extreme case of a well-observed trend: viz, people rate undesirable and 
involuntary events as more likely than desirable and voluntary ones (Slovic, 1995: xxxii, 26). It is also 
well established that people overestimate the frequency of rare events and underestimate the frequency 
of common ones. 
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frequency of murder might increase if fewer people thought it likely. This is 
conjectural at best but it does point to the idea that seeking to reduce levels of 
perceived risk may not unquestionably generate, if successful, a societal benefit. 
 
Indeed, it is arguable that anybody should reduce their risk self-ratings at all. This is 
the case as the concept of objective risk wilts under scrutiny. We take the 
subjective/objective risk pair to mean that if the percentage of some sample who think 
it is “likely” that they will be a victim of a particular crime is, for the sake of 
illustration, 20%, but that other data indicates that only 5% of the population from 
which the sample is drawn actually become victims each year, then 75% of those who 
think they are at risk, are worrying needlessly.6 
 
The problem is that the disjunction between objective and subjective risk is illusory. It 
is in no sense individually or collectively irrational for all of a given population to feel 
that there is some degree of likelihood that they will become a victim even though 
only a tiny proportion will actually become so. Until victimisation is inflicted on the 
few to which it eventually is, how can anybody know who should predict it for 
themselves? 
 
As Young put it, many years ago:  
 
“The exercise of relating an objective crime rate to a subjective level of fear is, from 
a realist perspective, flawed, because it assumes: that rationality would involve each 
subgroup of society having a fear of crime rate proportional to their risk rate; [and] 
that there is an objective crime rate irrespective of the subjective assessment of 
various subgroups” (1988: 173). 
 
Another problem surfaces here: is it possible to talk of an individual’s objective risk?7 
It seems that one can have an objective measure of general risk. From the fictitious 
example given above, this might be a 5% chance of being a victim of that particular 
crime. This can alternatively be expressed as 1 chance in 20 of it happening in the 
next 12 months, or as occurring once every 20 subsequent years.8 But this does not 
mean that one can have an objective measure of individual risk. In other words, an 
individual’s average general risk (the 5%) is not that individual’s actual personal risk. 
 
An example might clarify this. One of us lives in Scotland, where 5% of households 
are burgled each year. This is his average general risk. However, he lives in neither a 
rich nor a poor area; in a tenemental apartment which is neither on the ground nor top 
floor; alone but works at home all day; protected both by unclimbable plastic external 
downpipes and by a 5cm thick solid core front door made of Brazilian ramin fastened 
on the hinge side by five 15cm solid brass hinges interspersed with hinge bolts, and 
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  This assumes that the 5% who do become victimised were all in the cohort that thought this would 
happen. This isn’t true for the one test we are aware of (Ditton & Chadee, 2006). 
7
  Those who talk of “objective risk” presumably define risk as simply the mathematical probability of 
an event occurring within a specified future time period. However, most risk theorists (Kahneman, 
Tversky, Slovic, and so on – this point is developed and fully referenced in Ditton & Chadee, 2006 – 
define risk as the probability of an event occurring coupled in some way to the perceived magnitude of 
the impact it would have should it occur. 
8
  For lay persons, it seems that being victimised exhausts victimisation likelihood until the next cycle 
begins, i.e., that victimisation reduces the immediate chance of victimisation. Those familiar with 
patterns of repeat victimisation believe the reverse to be the case. 
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on the lock side by a 4-turn 5-lever lock that simultaneously throws 4 tungsten carbide 
bolts 8cm into a solid steel haft, and a rod with a floating core into the ceiling and 
another similar one into the floor. Each factor has probably reduced his actual risk of 
being burgled downwards from the average risk, although this change is incalculable. 
 
Subjective risk seems to be a valid concept, and henceforth here the use of the word 
risk implies this qualification. To make plain our viewpoint, much the same could be 
said of the fear of crime, viz: because there is no objective fear, then what is meant is 
subjective fear, and references to fear in the text that follows imply subjective fear.9 
 
 
Investigating Risk 
 
Thus, it follows that enquiry regarding the terminology and conceptualisation of 
risk demands additional attention. The necessity for debates such as those regarding 
actual (‘objective’) and appraised (‘subjective’) risk have developed, in part from the 
exponential growth of research and investigation. On an abstract level, contemporary 
discourse now talks of rapid social change and uncertainty (Beck, 1992) and the 
decline of trust and confidence in expertise (Giddens, 1990). Risk in the current era 
describes a shift from the confidence of modernity to a condition of perpetual doubt 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Thus as a society we now speak specifically of the 
omnipotence of risk (Furedi, 1998), primarily in relation to negative consequences 
and feelings of insecurity.  
 
Over the past thirty years, there have been many different avenues that risk research 
has followed and many different fields to which the term has been applied. 
Unhappily, the past trajectory of the term has been stunted by associated or 
amalgamated terms. Over time terms such as danger, harm, hazard, loss and 
catastrophe have all been used to highlight the negativity of risk. Probability, chance, 
possibility, potential, and likelihood have been used to describe the cost benefit 
equation of prediction. Worry, fear, anxiety, uncertainty and insecurity have all been 
used to describe the emotional reaction to such a situation. Although diversity can be 
useful as an exploratory methodological tool, the necessity for clear and coherent 
definitions of risk and/or its associations given the growth of literature is apparent. 
 
Primarily investigation has been separated by the use of risk to describe those 
conditions we are susceptible to and those which are actively sought. Researchers 
divide into those who have devoted time to the actual and appraised nature of 
voluntary risks, and those who aim to investigate involuntariness. Thus to take risks 
and to live ‘at risk’ are attitudes which now polarise the discipline. The dialogue 
surrounding involuntary risks, those specifically described in this paper, has 
traditionally received greater attention following the goal of risk avoidance and the 
modern institutional responsibility for safety. The risk discipline began and grew 
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  Ferraro (1995: 25) talks of “imagined” fear. This is not altogether inappropriate, as respondents are 
rarely actually experiencing fear when they tell surveyors that they are, to some degree or other, 
“fearful” (Garofalo, 1981: 841).  We feel that “subjective” fear is preferable, as the connotation of 
“imagined” is imaginery, and we prefer the socio-psychological idea that the subjective is real. 
Additionally, the very idea of talking of “objective fear” demonstrates how silly it is to talk of 
“objective risk”. We don’t believe that there is fear “out there” which is perceived by people. The same 
is true for risk. 
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through the 1980s with a focus on technological risk, and its perception by the lay 
public, by policy makers and those providing risk sensitive information. The variables 
used to test risk perception have remained stable but have expanded, and include: the 
intensity of dread, the predicted number of people exposed, the level of 
understanding, the unknown character, familiarity, the degree of controllability, 
voluntariness, the possible catastrophic potential and the distribution of possible risks 
and benefits (Slovic, et al.,1982; Kasperson, et al., 1988; Bouyer, et al., 2001).  These 
have come to be seen as more valuable tools in lay risk perception than any use of 
statistical predictions of likelihood of death or expected fatalities (Slovic, et al., 
1982). Further, dread –‘the perceived catastrophic potential of the hazard and the 
perceived lack of control over a situation’ - has repeatedly been shown to be the 
strongest influence in risk evaluations, even more so than the actual lethality level of 
the given hazard (Bouyer, et al., 2001:  457). 
 
The limitations of early investigation stemmed from ignorance of sociological 
explanations.  Discourse in this area increased with interest in the cultural bias of risk 
acceptability (Douglas, 1982), and the social amplification of risk (Kasperson, et al., 
1988) accounting for how and why individuals chose which risks to worry about.  
Such directions illuminated the battle within the risk discipline for the superiority of 
psychological, social, and structural accounts. Although beneficial in so far as they 
highlighted the complexities and limits of the cost/benefit assumption or low 
consequence/high probability, high consequence/low probability model (Kasperson, 
et al., 1988) many sociological directions fell short in their assumption that risk 
decisions, although socially diverse, were based on the rationality of the actor. Thus 
behavioural sciences began to tackle the question of risk, not by denying rationality 
but by describing choice via limitations and heuristics (Short, 1984).   Growing from 
the initial experiments of Tversky, Kahneman and colleagues in the early 1970s, 
heuristics explained why subjects made seemingly ‘bad’ decisions. The frames for 
such heuristics, suggests Heimer (1988), is the governance and variance of risk 
acceptability.  Short (1984: 719) uses the example of crime to make such a point.  
 
“Criminology and risk analysis are linked conceptually by the fact that both are 
concerned with classes of hazard, a very broad topic which has been divided in a 
variety of ways, but with little theoretical coherence.  Study of the similarities and 
differences among various classes of hazard is important if ‘the selection of dangers’ 
and the acceptability are to be understood (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  Processes 
involved in the ‘selection of dangers’ and similarities as well as differences among 
hazards, suggests that the search for commonalities in the nature of hazards, as well 
as in the perception, selection, and actions taken to avoid, control or repair damages 
resulting from hazards might be fruitful … the heuristics discovered by cognitive 
psychologists – common-sense principles of reasoning, e.g. ‘rules of thumb’ that 
people use when confronted with choices and the need to make decisions – are based 
on social rationality … Research on the fear of crime, for example, suggests that 
people respond to the ‘social facts’ of crime in ways which reflect their personal 
experience and values.”  
 
Research surrounding the biases of decision making has grown since the original 
work of Kahneman, Tversky & Slovic (1982), supplemented more recently by a new 
edited publication to update their original work. From this rapidly expanding 
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literature, concepts specific to individual psychology can be analysed:10  experience, 
optimism, knowledge, and the newer concept emotion. Specific biases related to these 
concepts have been shown to influence estimations of risk and lead to unrealistic 
accounts of likelihood and outcome.   
 
The cognitive dimension of decision making is complex and often relies on the 
process of attribute substitution. Weighting biases in cognitive reasoning occur when 
the target and the heuristic attributes differ and the latter is given too much or too little 
weight (Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002: 53). Thus in relation to experience such a 
process has been labelled the availability heuristic. In short, people predict on the 
basis of information available to them. 
 
For example, when faced with the question: ‘Are more deaths caused by rattlesnakes 
or bees? a respondent who read recently about someone who died from a snakebite or 
bee sting may use the relative availability of instances of the two categories as a 
heuristic’ (Anderson, 1991 in ibid. : 55). Thus a recent documentary about the 
lethality of bee stings may lead to an overestimation of likelihood. Therefore to ask - 
‘how likely am I to be murdered in the next 12 months?’ may provoke the alternative 
conception - ‘how many instances of murder come easily to my mind?’ Recent 
experiments devised to test such processing have shown some success. Research in 
relation to the estimated frequency of winning a contest, being arrested, subscribing to 
cable television and contracting a medical illness has supported the following 
hypothesis: when a hypothetical outcome is explained or imagined it becomes 
subjectively more likely to occur (Sherman et al., 2002: 98). Thus in the case of 
illness, subjects who actively constructed easy to imagine images (e.g., read about 
symptoms with ease) judged themselves to be more likely to contract the disease than 
those who could not so imagine. Further, if images became difficult to imagine 
(because abstract rather than concrete symptoms were presented) perceived likelihood 
decreased.  In addition, further research has suggested that vivid events are also 
overestimated in terms of likelihood (ibid.: 102).   
 
The creation and supply of such images has been critically addressed.  Drawing on the 
social environment as the frame for such heuristics, Heimer (1988: 499) argues that 
‘what institutions do is to provide us with a series of vivid experiences that then, 
through the availability heuristic, make us more likely to overestimate some risks and 
to underestimate others thus ‘social situations have some influence on how people 
perceive superficially identical risks’.  Further Heimer (1988:  494) makes the link 
between seemingly irrational risk perception and crime victimisation.   
 
“For example, Thaler (1983:  62) points out that death by homicide is rarer than 
death by suicide (even though suicides are underreported, since they are often 
classified as accidents).  But homicide receives more publicity than suicides and so 
are remembered more easily.  Further, one could argue that death by homicide 
violates a stronger cultural norm than death by suicide and that it is therefore a more 
threatening and significant event.  For these reasons, instances of homicide are more 
‘available’ than instances of suicide, and people overestimate the likelihood that 
someone will be murdered, relative to the likelihood that he or she will commit 
suicide.”  
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 The influence of the social environment and the structural conditions of society are also of worth and 
could be added to this discussion. 
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In addition to mediated or abstract experiences, lived experience can de-bias or re-
bias estimations of likelihood of voluntary and involuntary risks (it has never 
happened to me therefore it must not be frequent).  Such a statement is linked to the 
concept of optimism described here.  Furthermore critical incidents (personal or of a 
close relative or friend) (it has happened to me/them twice therefore it must be very 
frequent) can lead to a sense of vividness and dread of suggested events and thus lead 
to overestimation regardless of the context specific variables determining the 
individual’s behaviour (Denscombe, 2001 taken from the work of Kahneman, et al., 
1982).  In contrast Barnett & Breakwell (2001: 172) note that ‘other evidence 
suggests that people with a greater experience of constant and extreme risks may be 
less concerned’.  They give the example of residents living near nuclear power 
facilities and cite habituation as one explanation.  Further they found (ibid.: 176), via 
psychometric testing, that experience was one of the greatest predictors of concern for 
involuntary risks, linking such conclusions to aspects of control.  Thus we may find 
that not only can crime related images, previous personal or close personal 
victimisation or non-victimisation affect fear of crime, but such attributes also have a 
biasing impact on risk perception. 
 
The optimistic notion of ‘it won’t happen to me’ is well documented in the literature 
on adolescence, and is often used to justify or neutralise voluntary risk taking activity.  
Within wider society the institutional anxiety surrounding safety especially in relation 
to involuntary risks cements this concern (Furedi, 1998). However, in order to deal 
with uncertainty and the inability to avoid or even know all the risks, such a 
neutralisation may be of some use.  Whereas the concepts of dread and vividness 
which develop from experience may heighten our sense of vulnerability, optimistic 
bias may also effect perceived susceptibility  – ones belief in the likelihood of 
personal harm (Weinstein & Klein, 2002: 313). Often, as is found with many health 
related behaviours, one makes comparisons with the perceived risk of a neighbour, 
resulting in an underestimation of personal risk (negative outcomes are more likely to 
happen to them, positive outcomes are more likely to happen to me - Armor & Taylor, 
2002).  In turn, individuals tend to negate past experiences, their own and of others, if 
they contradict with their optimistic predictions (Buehler, et al.2002: 255).  Although 
there are obvious consequences of such unrealistic optimism, not least that of 
disappointment, there has been little empirical evidence which proves that optimism is 
detrimental (Armor & Taylor, 2002: 337).   
 
The ability to assign higher probabilities to attractive outcomes than ‘either objective 
criteria or logical analysis warrants’ (Armor & Taylor, 2002: 334) may act as a coping 
mechanism for life in contemporary society. However the respondents in this research 
showed something quite different.  Is it well documented that people overestimate 
unlikely events, such as those threatening mortality, to the extent for which the 
concept of pessimism could be applied.  Caution is warranted, as ‘one might hesitate 
to label the overestimation of negative but statistically infrequent outcomes as 
evidence of genuine, psychologically meaningful pessimism, however, as these 
estimates may simply reflect difficulties interpreting and reporting extreme 
probabilities’ (Armor & Taylor 2002: 336).  Further, people in other studies who 
appeared to report this type of pessimism, were shown to be optimistic when assessed 
on their relative likelihood rather than compared to population base rates (Rothman, 
1996: in ibid.). 
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The third contribution to the behavioural concept of risk is that of knowledge.  In 
many cases where private knowledge is not obtainable lay knowledge is reliant on 
expert predictions and a sense of trust. There are two overriding concerns with such a 
notion.  Firstly, we acknowledge that experts themselves are not capable of making 
predictions without succumbing to the biases of human judgement and often show 
signs of overconfidence (Slovic, et al., 1982). Secondly, the way in which the 
layperson uses and understands the knowledge presented to them is again subject to 
such biases.  Both concerns have been investigated by Kahneman & Tversky under 
the remit of the representativeness heuristic. Their 1971 experiments showed that 
statisticians ‘placed too much confidence in the results of small samples’ and 
suggested that the same occurs in everyday life (Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002: 49).  
The use of resemblance is therefore used to determine the ‘assessment of the degree 
of correspondence between a sample and a population, an instance and a category, an 
act and an actor or, more generally, between an outcome and a model.’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 2002: 22).  Considering the aforementioned example ‘Are more deaths 
caused by rattlesnakes or bees?’ they find ‘if no instances come to mind, the 
respondent might consult impressions of the ‘dangerousness’ of the typical snake or 
bee’ (Anderson, 1991 in Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002: 55).  Additionally it is 
suggested that the creation of such stereotyping is in part a product institutional power 
(Heimer, 1988: 499). 
 
In recent years the knowledge debate has been furthered by sociologists of risk to 
account for the mistrust of experts and expert systems. Thus in many situations the 
predictions of experts, for example number of fatalities or probability assessments, are 
not consulted. Furthermore, in most instances individuals believe their predictions are 
sound and that they have a clear knowledge of any possible risks.  It is, of course, 
impossible to achieve absolute knowledge. However in a society determined by risk 
acceptability, to admit we do not know is unacceptable (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982: 
49).   
 
“If we knew the risks we face, we might compare and order them accordingly to 
degrees of danger.  But can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we 
cannot; but yes, we must act as if we do.”  
 
 
Thus in experimental situations, cognitive researchers have identified the bias of 
overconfidence, where individuals appear ‘more confident in judgements than is 
warranted by the facts’ (Gilovich & Tversky, 2002: 230) and even expert assessments 
claim they are ‘often wrong but rarely in doubt’ (ibid.). In many situations such 
confidence is extremely difficult to eliminate and often controls further action (ibid.: 
248).  Such conditions link the concept of optimism to the knowledge debate. Like 
optimism, overconfidence makes people feel good, although the cited authors doubt 
that such benefits outweigh the possible costs (ibid.:  249). 
 
The final contribution found in the literature surrounding attribute substitution is that 
of emotion, the conscious or unconscious feeling which produces a positive or 
negative stimulus (Slovic, et al., 2002: 398).  
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“Although analysis is certainly important in some decision making circumstances, 
reliance on affect and emotion is a quicker, easier and more efficient way to navigate 
in a complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous world.” 
 
Events are evaluated and weighted accordingly.  Then, via a process of ‘affective 
mapping’ (ibid.:  405), positive emotion leads individuals to attempt to copy the 
recalled event based on a judgement of low risk, high benefit.  In turn negative 
emotion suggests the event should be avoided based on a contrasting judgement of 
high risk, low benefit.  Such an emotive response can also be related to risk 
estimations, which as noted, are highly dependent on the concept of dread.  Slovic and 
colleagues note that many of the results attributed to the availability heuristic may 
have a great deal to do with affect, thus affect laden images, rather than presented 
statistics, induce greater perceptions of risk where highly publicised images, for 
example accidents, fires, tornados cancer, homicide (found in their earlier research), 
may again have the most impact (ibid.:  414).  Such conclusions stemmed from the 
work of Johnson & Tversky  (1983, in Lerner & Keltner, 2000: 480) which involved 
the distribution of newspaper articles (chosen to provoke either positive or negative 
responses) to a selected sample who were subsequently asked to estimate annual 
fatalities of various activities. They found that those who absorbed stories provoking 
negative emotions gave more pessimistic estimates of likelihood – i.e. higher 
frequency of death. More recent work on risk judgements has found that anger and 
fear have opposite effects on risk perception. Even though both high in negative 
valence – fearful people (assessing the factors of uncertainty and lack of control) 
predicted higher risk whereas angry people gave significantly lower estimates (ibid.).  
No cause was identified. Using a criminological example Lerner et al. (2003) 
provided a link between emotion and responses to terrorism. They again found that 
anger triggered optimistic beliefs, whereas fear instigated greater pessimism.   
 
The ‘risk as feelings hypothesis’ (Loewenstein, et al., 2001 in Kobbeltved, et al., 
2005) is therefore of interest in its assumption that risky responses come from direct 
emotional influences including feelings of worry, fear, dread, or anxiety.  Feelings of 
dread have been found to be the main determinant in the perception of risk, and 
indicates a reliance on feelings to make risk decisions.  Alternatively reviews of the 
current literature show that worry is only moderately related to perceived risk, where 
such a concept relates more to feeling unsafe than perceived risk (ibid.: 433).  In their 
research, Kobbeltved et al. found that even with high levels of worry and/or 
emotional distress (military) respondents did not report pessimistic risk judgements.  
They concluded that policy makers therefore should not test worry as evidence for 
irrational risk and danger judgements, rather the publics’ perception of risk (which 
does not change as a function of worry) is a more realistic indicator. 
 
Given the evidence which suggests that risk estimations are subjected to heuristic 
biases, should one attempt to alter or de-bias such judgements?  The consequences of 
such must first be noted.  Risk perception studies have not only been concerned with 
initial perception but the behavioural responses to such an assessment.  Kasperson, et 
al. (1988) note that secondary consequences of the perception of risk events, i.e. the 
behaviour one exhibits, may lead to an increase or decrease in the physical risk 
itself.11  The behaviour that people exhibit when faced with the potential of risk is 
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based on their judgements and heuristic biases.  Thus, and to give a broad example, if 
one has high levels of perceived risk, the consequence may be increased safety 
conscious behaviour or risk aversion.   
 
Changing perception (risk self-rating) may have both positive and negative 
consequences.  Furedi (1998: 25) notes that fear has been perceived by many public 
health officials as a ‘small price to pay’ for providing risk information to the 
population as a whole (e.g. risks of skin cancer) designed to increase risk sensitivity.  
Such a price (the unethical creation of worry across the board rather than targeting 
specific cross sections) does not allow individuals to make informed decisions about 
risk, but plays on emotional states.  Reference to the biased perception of the risk of 
crime to the elderly and situations of ‘house arrest’ (Ditton & Chadee 2003: 418) 
cement this point.  In this instance the attempts to de-bias the concept of risk becomes 
intertwined with the concept of fear or subsequent emotional response. 
 
The downside of reducing the perception of risk may lead to behaviour which 
increases the likelihood of an adverse consequence occurring. Such a concept is 
described by Adams (1995) as ‘risk compensation’. He gives the example of seat belt 
legislation and increased media campaigns, which although promoting safe driving, 
allows the driver to take more risks whilst under the ‘illusion of control’ (Lyng, 
1990).  Thus if the risk self-rating of criminal victimisation was lowered, the 
compensatory behaviour may place individuals in heightened situations of risk. In 
contrast Furedi also notes (1998: 24) that increasing sensitivity to risk events, namely 
road rage in the 1980s, can increase the likelihood of fatalities, due in his example to 
drivers subsequently carrying hand guns.   
 
The methodologies used by risk researchers have themselves been open to criticism.  
Wahlberg (2001) notes that to rely on questionnaires to assess risk perception negates 
the essence of thought and feeling associated with risk.  Sjoberg notes that the act of 
filling in the questionnaire bears little resemblance to, and may momentarily increase, 
anxiety found in the outside world (1998, in Wilkinson 2001).  Wahlberg continues 
that behaviour is therefore not investigated and no real appreciation of ‘why’ is 
deduced (2001: 241).  This is further fuelled by predetermined risks provided to the 
subjects and selected solely by the researchers rather than allowing self-definition 
(Wilkinson 2001: 9).  Finally the way risk is measured may play a large part in the 
final conclusions surrounding risk appraisal (ibid.). Kobbeltved, et al., (2005: 428) 
suggests that risk research much consider whether general/average risk or personal 
risk is being assessed, and whether studies have taken into consideration risk 
exposure. The specific way in which prediction is measured has also been shown to 
bias output.  The compatibility hypothesis shows that the use of diverse methods of 
prediction, for example grades or ranking to predict academic performance, permits 
more weight to be given if measurement is on the same scale (Slovic, et al., 2002: 
220), should also be considered.  Finally, evidence has shown that there may be 
differences in the cultural use of response scales (Yates, et al., 2002: 274).   
 
Although methodological limitations are evident with most fields of research, the 
complex nature of defining, conceptualising and applying risk to selected subjects has 
yet to be thoroughly investigated. The examination of fear, as an association of risk, 
supported by the recent direction of the affective model of risk perception may also 
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benefit from further analysis. How has risk and fear been dealt with in what might be 
termed the ‘fear of crime’ literature? 
 
 
Re-visiting Fear and Risk 
 
There has been one sophisticated attempt (the work of Warr) and one semi-
sophisticated one (the work of Bankston and colleagues) to relate risk to fear – and a 
very large number of comparatively unsophisticated ones. Table 1 summarises these 
latter studies, with the right-hand column indicating the size (where given), but not 
the significance (cited too rarely to warrant citation here) of the correlation between 
the two. These studies are listed in alphabetical order, and the table is highly 
derivative of one constructed by Ferraro (1995: 28-9). We have updated it, but deleted 
any reference to studies cited by him, but which relied only on “objective” risk and 
fear, and those which have not stated explicitly a fear/risk correlation coefficient. 
__________________________ 
 
Table 1 here 
__________________________ 
 
It can be seen from Table 1 that the correlation range is wide (from 0.09 to 0.76) but 
the comparison is hardly fair as the operationalised definitions of risk and fear are 
almost all idiosyncratic, there is an enormous range of sample sizes, an assortment of 
sample selection mechanisms, a variety of respondent interview methods, a 32 year 
range in publication, an extensive geographic range of research location, a variety of 
sample entry eligibility criteria, a series of differing correlation techniques, and 
questioning on a broad range of offences. This is emblematic of any attempt to meta-
analyse sub fields within the general area of the fear of crime. Initially, a number of 
studies appear to offer data and analysis that can be pooled. On inspection, no two 
have sufficient in common to allow this to take place. 
 
There is a further sub-set of studies (Bankston, et al., 1987; Boggs, 1971; Box, et al., 
1988; Jaycox, 1978; Lee, 1982; Lewis & Maxfield, 1980; McPherson, 1978; 
Roundtree & Land, 1996; Smith & Torstensson, 1987) that have investigated 
empirically risk and fear, but that have not reported the quantitative relationship. A 
few studies suggest, from their titles that they are about some quantifiable version of 
risk, but turn out not to be (Chan & Rigakos, 2002; Gustafson, 1998; Walklate, 1997).  
 
For yet other studies, definitions are unconventional. Chiricos, et al., (1997) mislabels 
safety variables as risk ones, Rucker (1990) fear variables as risk ones, and Wiltz 
(1982) risk variables as fear ones. For Furstenberg (1971) risk equals fear, and for 
Brantingham, et al., (1986) risk is combined with fear, and the result confusingly 
called “fear”. 
 
Method 
 
Sample 
Data are from all three waves of the Community Living and Integration Survey, 
conducted by the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre, Faculty of Social 
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Sciences, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, which piloted in 
early 1999 (see Chadee & Ditton, 1999). The first full wave was conducted in 
September 1999 (n=728), the second in September 2000 (n=636), and the third in 
September 2001 (n=716). The sampling frame was a multi-stage cluster design. 
Within each household, the self-declared head of the household (or the next 
responsible adult aged at least 18 years) was chosen as the respondent.  
 
The initial achieved sample was representative of the Trinidadian population, 
specifically for age, geographical location and occupation. Some 159 respondents 
were only in wave 1, 117 only in wave 2, and 234 only in wave 3. Some 139 were in 
waves 1 and 2, 102 were in waves 1 and 3, and 50 in waves 2 and 3. Finally, 330 
respondents were in all three waves.  Sample demographics are in Table 2. It can be 
seen that the structure of the three samples is broadly similar. 
__________________________ 
 
Table 2 here 
__________________________ 
 
 
 
Measures 
The questions used to measure fear of becoming a victim of particular crimes were the 
now standard specifics (adopted from Ferraro and LaGrange, 1992). Each was asked: 
"How much would you say you fear... 
 
29. Being approached on the street by a beggar? 
30. Being cheated, conned, or swindled out of some money? 
31. Have someone attempt to break into your home while you are away? 
32. Have someone break into your home while you are there? 
33. Being raped or sexually assaulted? 
34. Being murdered? 
35. Being attacked by someone with a weapon? 
36. Have your car stolen? 
37. Being robbed or mugged on the street? 
38. Property damaged by vandals? 
39. Being kidnapped? 
40. Being a victim of crime in your workplace? 
41. Being a victim of crime when you are out liming?12 
42. Being a victim of crime in the near future? 
 
Respondents were offered the following response options: "very afraid", "afraid", 
"unafraid" or "very unafraid". 
 
The questions used to measure likelihood of becoming a victim of particular crimes 
were effectively identical. Each was asked: "How likely do you think it is that the 
following will happen to you in the next year…  
 
                                                 
12
  “Liming” is a Trinidadian word. It means youths hanging about on street corners at dusk. 
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 66. Being approached on the street by a beggar? 
 67. Being cheated, conned, or swindled out of some money? 
 68. Have someone attempt to break into your home while you are away? 
 69. Have someone break into your home while you are there? 
 70. Being raped or sexually assaulted? 
 71. Being murdered? 
 72. Being attacked by someone with a weapon? 
 73. Have your car stolen? 
 74. Being robbed or mugged on the street? 
 75. Property damaged by vandals? 
 76. Being kidnapped? 
 77. Being a victim of crime in your workplace? 
 78. Being a victim of crime when you are out liming? 
 79. Being a victim of crime in the near future?” 
 
Respondents were offered the following response options: "very likely", "likely", 
"unlikely" or "very unlikely".  
 
 
Results 
 
(i) Simple risk/fear correlations 
 
Table 3 contains the result of correlating fear for each offence with risk for its pair. 
Correlations for some offence pairs (car theft, kidnap, work crime, liming, and future 
crime) are not included as these play no part in the indices used later in this article. 
__________________________ 
 
Table 3 here 
__________________________ 
 
Of the 27 possible correlations, all but the 3 for begging are statistically significant 
positive correlations. Non-correlatively, apart from the 3 begging relationships (and 
those for being conned and being burgled when not there in wave 3, and the 
difference here is small), tend to be more afraid of each offence than think it likely. 
Begging is clearly different, and may indicate either or both of: the more frequently a 
negative event is experienced, the less fearful of it people become, and/or less serious 
offences simply happen more often. 
 
Again except for begging, the correlation coefficients typically exhibit greater 
variance offence to offence within the same wave than they do for the same offence 
across waves. The maximum average difference between minimum and maximum 
coefficient size across offences for all three waves is .162, whereas the maximum 
average difference between minimum and maximum coefficient size across waves for 
all eight offences is .084. This offers limited support for the notion that risk 
perceptions are more stable over time than across wave. 
 
On the other hand, the coefficients are not large, and range from .208 to .459, 
suggesting common variance of only between 4% and 21%. Put another way, this 
may be taken as some evidence that the two variables are substantially independent.  
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(i) Complex risk sensitivity 
 
In two articles, Mark Warr developed the idea of “risk sensitivity”. In his 1984 article 
(which focuses on people), his basic argument is that identical levels of risk do not 
produce identical levels of fear. The implication is that single correlation will distort 
the real relationship, which will be revealed by linear correlation. For example, for 
women and men, the thresholds and slopes of fear of burglary may well be different. 
In his example (Graph A in Figure 1 of Warr, 1984) fear is at 0 when risk is lower for 
women than for men (a lower threshold). As perceived risk increases for each group, 
fear increases faster for women than for men. He later claims (p. 695) that “the more 
serious the offense is perceived to be, the faster fear will increase with perceived risk 
(i.e., the greater the slope of fear on risk) and/or the greater the fear at all levels of 
perceived risk (i.e., the greater the intercept)”. In his 1987 article (which focuses on 
crimes), he defines threshold as: “the point at which increasing risk begins to trigger 
fear” and slope as “the rate at which fear increases with perceived risk” (p. 39). 
 
Warr’s model cannot be followed exactly as he examines both risk and fear (for each 
offence) with 11 point (0-10) scales. Linear regression, with assumed linearity, 
presupposes interval data, but 0-10 scales for concepts like fear and risk are “mock” 
intervals which suggest a degree of precision that probably is not there 
 
Bankston et al. (1987) developed a simpler model, with both risk and fear coded on a 
simple 3 point scale (“not”, “somewhat” and “very” in both cases). They (their Table 
3, p. 105) regressed fear on risk, reported the slope (eg, top left hand in their Table 3) 
as .46, and then gave the values for each of 3 risk values. This is unnecessary as the 
first value (.86 for risk = 0 in his case) is merely the intercept, with the other two 
values (1.32 and 1.78) increasing by the slope of .46 in a linear fashion. Giving the 
intercept and the slope would have been sufficient.  
 
It is possible to combine the virtues (and eliminate the vices) of each approach, by 
recreating the property and personal fear and risk indices (and combined indices) as 
illustrated in Chadee & Ditton (2003). The FearPersonalCrimeIndex is an additive 
combination of fear of: having somebody break into a home when R is there; of being 
raped or sexually assaulted; of being murdered; and of being attacked by someone 
with a weapon. The FearPropertyCrimeIndex is an additive function of fear of: being 
cheated conned or swindled out of some money; of having someone break into a 
home when R is away; of being robbed or mugged on the street; and of having 
property damaged by vandals. The FearAllCrimeIndex was created additively from 
being fearful of: being approached on the street by a beggar; being cheated conned or 
swindled out of some money; having someone break into a home when R is away; 
having somebody break into a home when R is there; being raped or sexually 
assaulted; being murdered; being attacked by someone with a weapon; being robbed 
or mugged on the street; and of having property damaged by vandals. These 
combinations may seem to arbitrarily partition crimes into personal and property 
when some contain elements of both. However, the combinations were originally 
suggested by factor analysing data from waves 1 and 2. The risk indices were created 
identically from matching risk variables, and were not separately factor analysed. 
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They can then be regressed on each other, and the slopes and intercepts reported, as in 
Table 4. Creation of indices such as this combines the merit of Bankston, et al.’s short 
ordinal response scales, with Warr’s interval variables. The partial indices are 0-12 
scales, and the total indices are 0-27 point scales. The resulting regressions are in 
Table 4. 
__________________________ 
 
Table 4 here 
__________________________ 
 
Surprising little can be made of this. First, there is some – but not much – evidence that risk 
sensitivity distinguishes males from females. In all three waves, when the genders are 
compared, the intercepts are always higher for females (i.e., when females rate risk as 0, they 
exhibit more fear than do males under the same risk condition). However, the slopes are 
always steeper for males. This may well be because of a possible “ceiling” effect for females, 
i.e., with a high intercept, it is harder to have a steep slope (Chiricos, et al., 1997a). 
Nevertheless, in wave 1, except for two comparisons (rows 22 & 23, and 24 & 25) the 
maximum levels of fear are higher for females than they are for males. This is the case in 
wave 2 except for four of nine comparisons (8 & 9, 18 & 19, 22 & 23, and 26 & 27), and in 
wave 3 except for one comparison (6 & 7). Because of the slope effect, the differences 
between levels of maximum fear for each comparison are less than the differences between 
the intercepts.  
 
Second, as for age, the three key comparisons (rows 10 & 11, rows 12 & 13, and rows 14 & 
15) indicate that the young have higher intercepts (except for rows 12 & 13 in wave 2), but 
there is little difference between the slopes or between the levels of maximum fear. However, 
on balance, the young seem slightly more risk-sensitive than the old. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Relating risk and fear, whether simply or in a more complex fashion, has not been as 
productive as had been imagined. The attempt has, however, shown that they are 
separate concerns, and that risk is not acting as a proxy for fear.  
 
One basic difficulty relates to a confusion of terms here, and a lack of subsequent 
agreement about the nature of the relationship between them. “Risk” is the greatest 
culprit: the simplest way is merely to conceptualise it as the probability of an event 
occurring in a specified time period, but risk is rather more frequently conceptualised 
as a more complicated yet less precisely specified combination of the probability of 
an event occurring coupled to the magnitude of the impact it might have should it 
occur (Adams, 1995: 69; Slovic, 2000: 195, 232). For yet others it means something 
as remote as “manufactured uncertainty” (Beck, 1992).  The ways in which 
individuals appraise the likelihood of personal risk, we believe is a product of 
heuristic biases.  Although such processes are not mutually exclusive nor is it possible 
to say with certainty which bias is operating in which given situation.  For these 
subjects their overestimations of likelihood may have developed from availability, 
representativeness, overconfidence, or emotive heuristics, however it is questionable 
as to whether attempts should be made to address them, not least with regard to 
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changes in consequential behaviour.  Furthermore, re-alignment ultimately becomes 
redundant if the nature of actual or objective risk (as opposed to average risk) is 
spurious.   
 
As a concept, fear of crime is no easier to pin down than is risk. Fear has been used in 
many different ways (from being a general concern with crime in society to a specific 
worry about becoming a victim) and regularly but carelessly used interchangeably 
with concepts such as anxiety, with which it is erroneously believed to be 
synonymous.13 It has accordingly lost any specific agreed meaning, and future 
research might most sensibly be oriented to theoretical development. 
 
The data presented here does not suggest that changes in perceived personal risk will 
have considerable effects on personal levels of fear, nor can substantial predictions be 
made regarding demographic differences in risk sensitivity. The exact nature of the 
risk/fear relationship therefore remains elusive as is the extent to which the 
investigation of fear can add to the risk debate. The suggested independence of the 
two variables should act as a signal for the separation of further analysis to provide 
clear and coherent dimensions before such comparisons and correlations are 
attempted in the future. 
 
 
References 
 
Adams, J. (2000) Risk, UCL Press, London. 
 
Armor, D. & Taylor, S. (2002) “When predictions fail: The dilemma of unrealistic 
optimism” in Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, 334-347, CUP, Cambridge. 
 
Barnett, J. & Breakwell, G.M. (2001) “Risk perception and experience: Hazard 
personality profiles and individual differences”, Risk Analysis, 21 (1): 171-177. 
 
Bankston, W., Jenkins, Q., Thayer-Doyle, C. & Thompson, C. (1987) "Fear of criminal 
victimisation and residential location: The influence of perceived risk", Rural Sociology, 52 
(1): 98-107. 
 
Bankston, W. & Thompson, C. (1989) “Carrying firearms for protection: A causal model”, 
Sociological Enquiry, 59 (1): 75-87. 
 
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society, Sage, London. 
 
Boggs, S. (1971) "Formal and informal crime control: An exploratory study of urban, 
suburban, and rural orientations", Sociological Quarterly, 12: 319-327. 
 
Bouyer, M. Bagdassarian, S. Chabanne, S. & Mullet, E. (2001) “Personality correlates 
of risk perception”, Risk Analysis, 21 (3): 457 – 465. 
 
                                                 
13
  It is intriguing to speculate where we might be now if fear of crime had originally been investigated 
by experts on fear rather than by experts on crime. 
 17 
Box, S., Hale, C., Andrews, G. (1988) "Explaining fear of crime", British Journal of 
Criminology, 28 (3): 340-56. 
 
Buehler, R. Griffin, D. & Ross, M. (2002) “Inside the planning fallacy: The causes and 
consequences of optimistic time predictions” in Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. 
(eds) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, 250-270, CUP, 
Cambridge.  
 
Chadee, D. (2003) “Fear of crime and risk of victimisation: An ethnic comparison” 
Social and Economic Studies, 52 (1): 73-97. 
 
Chadee, D. & Ditton, J. (2003) “Are older people most afraid of crime? Revisiting Ferraro 
and LaGrange in Trinidad”, British Journal of Criminology, 43 (2): 417-433. 
 
Chadee, D. & Ditton, J. (2006) “People’s perceptions of their likely future risk of criminal 
victimisation”, Forthcoming, British Journal of Criminology. 
 
Chan, W. & Rigakos, G. (2002) “Risk, crime and gender”, British Journal of Criminology, 
42 (4): 743-761. 
 
Chiricos, T., Hogan, M. & Gertz, M. (1997) “Racial composition of neighbourhood and fear 
of crime”, Criminology, 35 (1): 107-131. 
 
Chiricos, T., Eschholz, S. & Gertz, M. (1997a) “Crime, news and fear of crime: Toward an 
identification of audience effects”, Social Problems, 44 (3): 342-357. 
 
Denscombe, M. (2001) “Critical incidents and the perception of health risks”, Health Risks 
and Society, 3 (3): 261-281. 
 
Douglas, M. & Wildavsky, A. (1982) “How can we know the risks we face? Why risk 
selection is a social process”, Risk Analysis, 2 (2): 49-51. 
 
Ferraro, K. & LaGrange, R. (1992) “Are older people most afraid of crime? Reconsidering 
age differences in fear of victimisation”, Journal of Gerontology, 47 (5): 233-244. 
 
Ferraro, K. (1995) Fear of Crime: Interpreting Victimisation Risk, SUNY Press, Albany. 
 
Furedi, F. (1998) Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low 
Expectation, Cassell, London.  
 
Garofalo, J. (1981) "The fear of crime: Causes and consequences", Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 72 (2): 839-857. 
 
Giles-Sims, J. (1984) "A Multivariate analysis of perceived likelihood of victimisation and 
degree of worry about crime among older people", Victimology, 9 (2): 222-233. 
 
Griffin, D  & Tversky, A. (2002) “The Weighting of Evidence and the Determinants 
of confidence” in Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, 230-249, CUP, Cambridge.  
 
 18 
Gustafson, P. (1998) “Gender differences in risk perception: Theoretical and methodological 
perspectives”, Risk Analysis, 18 (6): 805-811. 
 
Heimer, C.A. (1988) “Social structure, psychology and the estimation of risk, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 14: 491-519. 
 
Jaycox, V. (1978) “The elderly's fear of crime: Rational or irrational?” Victimology, 
3: 329-334. 
 
Kahneman, D. Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1982) Judgement Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, CUP, Cambridge. 
 
Kahneman, D. & Fredrick, S. (2002) “Representativeness revisited: Attribute 
substitution in intuitive judgement” in Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. (eds) 
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, 49-81, CUP, 
Cambridge. 
 
Kasperson, R. E. Renn, O. Slovic, P. Brown, H. S. Emel, J. Goble, R. Kasperson, J. 
X. & Ratick, S. (1988) “The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework, 
Risk Analysis, 8 (2): 177-187. 
 
Kobbeltved, T. Brun, W. Johnsen, B. & Eid, J. (2005) "Risk as feelings or risk and feelings? 
A cross-lagged panel analysis", Journal of Risk Research, 8 (5): 417-437. 
 
LaGrange, R. & Ferraro, K. (1989) "Assessing age and gender differences in perceived risk 
and fear of crime", Criminology, 27 (4): 697-719. 
 
LaGrange, R., Ferraro, K. & Supancic, M. (1992) "Perceived risk and fear of crime: Role of 
social and physical incivilities", Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 29 (3): 
311-34. 
 
Lee, G. (1982a) "Residential location and fear of crime among the elderly", Rural Sociology, 
47 (4): 655-669. 
 
Lerner, J.S. & Keltner, D. (2000) "Beyond valence: Toward a model of enotion-specific 
influences on judgement and choice", Cognition and Emotion, 14 (4): 473-493. 
 
Lerner, J.S. Gonzalez, R.M. Small, D.A. & Fischhoff, B. (2003) "Effects of fear and anger on 
perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment", Psychological Science, 14 (2). 
 
Lewis, D. & Maxfield, M. (1980) "Fear in the neighbourhood: An investigation on the impact 
of crime", Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 17:160-189. 
 
Lyng, S. (1990) “Edgework: A social psychological analysis of voluntary risk taking”, 
American Journal of Sociology, 95 (4): 851-886. 
 
McPherson, M. (1978) “Realities and perceptions of crime at the neighborhood level”, 
Victimology, 3: 321-330. 
 
 19 
Mesch, G. (2000) “Perceptions of risk, lifestyle activities, and fear of crime”, Deviant 
Behaviour, 21 (1): 47-62. 
 
Miethe, T. and Lee, G. (1984) “Fear of crime among older people: A reassessment of 
the predictive power of crime related factors” Sociological Quarterly, 25: 397-4l5. 
 
Ortega, S. & Myles, J. (1987) "Race and gender effects on fear of crime: An interactive model 
with age", Criminology, 25: 133-52.  
 
Parker, K., McMorris, B., Smith, E. & Murty, K. (1993) "Fear of crime and the likelihood of 
victimisation: A bi-ethnic comparison", The Journal of Social Psychology, 133 (5): 723-32. 
 
Riger, S., Gordon, M. & LeBailly, R. (1978) “Women’s fear of crime: From blaming 
to restricting the victim”, Victimology, 3 (3-4): 274-284. 
 
Rountree, P. & Land, K. (1996) “Perceived risk versus fear of crime: Empirical evidence of 
conceptually distinct reactions in survey data”, Social Forces, 74 (4): 1353-1403. 
 
Schwarzenegger, C. (1991) “Public attitudes to crime: Findings of the Zurich victim survey”, 
pp. 681-730 in G. Kaiser, H. Kury & H-J. Albrecht (eds) Victims and Criminal Justice: 
Victimological Research – Stocktaking and Prospects, Max Planck Institut Research 
Report No. 50, Freiburg, 1991. 
 
Sherman, S. Cialdini, R. Schwartzman, D & Reynolds, K. (2002) “Imagining can heighten or 
lower perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: The mediating effect of imagery” in 
Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of 
Intuitive Judgement, 98-102, CUP, Cambridge.  
 
Short, J.F. (1984) “The social fabric at risk: Towards the social transformation of risk 
analysis”, American Sociological Review, 49 (6): 711-725. 
 
Sjoberg, L. (1997) “Explaining risk perception: An empirical evaluation of cultural theory”, 
Risk, Decision and Policy, 2  (2): 113-130. 
 
Slovic, P. Fischoff, B. Lichtenstein, S. (1982) “Why study risk perception?”, Risk Analysis, 2 
(2): 83-94. 
 
Slovic, P. (2000) The Perception of Risk, Earthscan, London. 
 
Slovic, P. Finucane, M. Peters, E. & MacGregor, D. (2002) “The affect heuristic”, in 
Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, 397-420, CUP: Cambridge.  
 
Smith, W. & Torstensson, M. (1997) "Gender differences in risk perception and neutralising 
fear of crime" British Journal of Criminology, 37 (4): 608-634. 
 
Sparks, G. & Ogles, R. (1990) “The difference between fear of victimisation and the 
probability of being victimised: Implications for cultivation”, Journal of Broadcasting and 
Electronic Media, 34 (3): 351-358. 
 
 20 
Taylor, D., Taub, R. & Peterson, B. (1986) "Crime, community organisation, and causes of 
neighborhood decline", pp. 161-127 in R. Figlio, S. Hakim & R. Renegert (eds) Metropolitan 
Crime Patterns, Criminal Justice Press, New York. 
 
Thomas, C. & Hyman, J. (1977) "Perceptions of crime, fear of victimisation, and public 
perceptions of police performance", Journal of Police Science and Administration, 5 (3): 
305-317. 
 
Thompson, C., Bankston, W. & St. Pierre, R. (1991) "Single female-headed households, 
handgun possession, and the fear of crime", Sociological Spectrum, 11: 231-244. 
 
Tulloch, M. (2000) “The meaning of age differences in the fear of crime: Combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches”, British Journal of Criminology, 40 (3): 451-467. 
 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (2002) “Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction 
fallacy in probability judgement” in Gilovich, T. Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D. (eds) 
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, 19-48, CUP, Cambridge.  
 
Wahlberg, A.E. (2001) “The theoretical features of some current approaches to risk 
perception”, Journal of Risk Research, 4 (3): 237-250. 
 
Walklate, S. (1997) "Risk and criminal victimisation: A modernist dilemma", British Journal 
of Criminology, 37 (1): 35-45. 
 
Warr, M. & Stafford, M. (1983) "Fear of victimisation: A look at the proximate causes", 
Social Forces, 61 (4): 1033-1043. 
 
Warr, M. (1984) "Fear of victimisation: Why are women and the elderly more afraid?" Social 
Science Quarterly, 65: 681-702. 
 
Warr, M. (1985) “Fear of rape among urban women” Social Problems, 32: 238-250. 
 
Warr, M. (1987) "Fear of victimisation and sensitivity to risk", Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 3 (1): 29-46. 
 
Warr, M. (1989) “What is the perceived seriousness of crimes?” Criminology, 27: 
795-821. 
 
Warr, M. (1990) "Dangerous situations: Social context and fear of victimization", Social 
Forces, 68(3): 891-907. 
 
Wilkinson, I. (2001) “Social theories of risk perception: At once indispensable and 
insufficient, Current Sociology, 49 (1): 1-22. 
 
Wiltz, C. (1982) "Fear of crime, criminal victimisation and elderly blacks", Phylon: The 
Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture, XLIII (4): 283-294. 
 
Young, J. (1988) “Risk of crime and fear of crime: The politics of victimization 
studies” in M. Maguire & J. Ponting (eds) Victims of Crime: A New Deal, Open 
University Press, Milton Keynes. 
 21 
 
Table 1: Studies comparing subjective risk and subjective fear 
 
Study; date Subjective Risk Subjective Fear r2 
Bankston & Thompson, 1989  Risk index Fear index 0.43 
Chadee, 2003 10 item scale 10 item scale 0.43 
Chadee & Ditton, 2003  28 point index 28 point index 0.36 
Ferraro & LaGrange, 1992 10-item index; 2 latent 
variables 
10-item index; 2 latent 
variables 
0.56 
Ferraro, 1995  10 item scale 10 item scale 0.65 
Giles-Sim, 1984 5-item index; 
pers./prop. 
4-item index; 2 latent 
variables 
0.42 
LaGrange & Ferraro, 1989  2 items; pers./prop 11-item index; 2 latent 
variables 
0.20 
LaGrange et al., 1992 10-item index; 2 latent 
variables 
10-item index; 2 latent 
variables 
0.71 
Mesch, 2000 3-item index 2 items 0.18 
Miethe & Lee, 1984 2 pers. Items  
2 prop. items 
2 pers. Items 
2 prop. items 
0.45 
0.31 
Ortega & Myles, 1987 Neighborhood risk GSS 0.20 
Parker, et al.; 1993 4-item index Single item score 0.47 
Riger et al., 1978 Rape risk NCS 0.68 
Schwarzenegger, 1991 Victim prognosis GSS, “daytime” GSS 0.09 
Sparks & Ogles, 1990 Risk of violence Fear of violence 0.24 
Taylor et al, 1986  1 risk measure 4 worry measures 0.68 
Thomas & Hyman, 1977  4-item index 9-item index, mixes fear 
and risk 
0.70 
Thompson et al, 1991 3 item risk rape scale 3 item fear rape scale 0.35 
Tulloch, 2000 4 point risk scale 4 point fear scale 0.57 
Warr & Stafford, 1983 16 items 16 items 0.76 
Updated from Table 3.2 in Ferraro, 1995: 29-30. 
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Table 2: Sample Demographics 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 All waves 
% male 42 41 43 43 
% Afro-Trinidadian 36 32 35 36 
% Indo-Trinidadian 45 50 48 45 
% Mixed race 19 17 17 18 
% White 1 - 1 1 
Age range 18-94 16-94 15-86 15-94 
Age mean 45 44 44 43 
 
Table 3: Fear/Risk correlations 
 
r 
sig 
N 
% 
 
% 
Wave1 
Correl-    
-ations 
Wave 1 
%Afraid 
%Likely 
Wave2 
Correl-    
-ations 
Wave 2 
%Afraid 
%Likely 
Wave3 
Correl-    
-ations 
Wave 3 
%Afraid 
%Likely 
29Fbeb 
by 
66Rbeg 
-.056 
.138 
 695 
29 
 
78 
-.004 
.917 
 604 
35 
 
77 
.026 
.493 
 681 
27 
 
79 
30Fcon 
by 
67Rcon 
.426 
.000 
 687 
45 
 
39 
.267 
.000 
 612 
52 
 
47 
.379 
.000 
 687 
41 
 
44 
31FburgAway 
by 
68RburgAway 
.286 
.000 
 692 
68 
 
60 
.208 
.000 
 605 
69 
 
64 
.320 
.000 
 685 
58 
 
60 
32FburgThere 
by 
69RburgThere 
.290 
.000 
 690 
67 
 
43 
.306 
.000 
 610        
68 
 
45 
.272 
.000 
 694 
55 
 
39 
33Frape 
by 
70Rrape 
.412 
.000 
 643 
63 
 
41 
.378 
.000 
 585 
65 
 
37 
.391 
.000 
 675 
53 
 
34 
34Fmurder 
by 
71Rmurder 
.289 
.000 
 651 
68 
 
43 
.210 
.000 
 557 
72 
 
45 
.249 
.000 
 653 
61 
 
42 
35Fattack 
by 
72Rattack 
.290 
.000 
 664 
76 
 
57 
.247 
.000 
 600 
73 
 
52 
.308 
.000 
 688 
65 
 
53 
37Frob 
by 
74Rrob 
.332 
.000 
 688 
70 
 
59 
.277 
.000 
 609 
75 
 
62 
.310 
.000 
 685 
64 
 
63 
38Fvandal 
by 
75Rvandal 
.459 
.000 
 684 
56 
 
38 
.328 
.000 
 602 
56 
 
43 
.392 
.000 
 690 
45 
 
42 
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Table 4: Fear/Risk linear regressions 
 
 
 Wave 1 
(n=730) 
Wave 2 
(n=636) 
Wave 3 
(n=716) 
 
 
Inter 
-cept 
[n] 
Slope 
(r2) 
Max 
Fear 
Inter 
-cept 
[n] 
Slope 
(r2) 
Max 
Fear 
Inter 
-cept 
[n] 
Slope 
(r2) 
Max 
Fear 
1. All 9.16 
[730] 
.51 
(.18) 
22.93 11.32 
[636] 
.40 
(.10) 
22.12 7.94 
[716] 
.49 
(.17) 
21.17 
2. Pe 5.10 
[730] 
.48 
(.15) 
10.86 5.72 
[636] 
.43 
(.09) 
10.88 4.79 
[716] 
.42 
(.11) 
9.83 
3 Pr 
 
4.06 
[730] 
.50 
(.20) 
10.06 5.12 
[636] 
.35 
(.09) 
9.32 3.70 
[716] 
.44 
(.17) 
8.98 
4 All m 
 
6.74 
[310] 
.58 
(.27) 
22.40 8.10 
[263] 
.49 
(.15) 
21.33 5.79 
[304] 
.50 
(.27) 
19.29 
5 All f 
 
11.86 
[420] 
.39 
(.11) 
22.39 15.04 
[373] 
.24 
(.04) 
21.52 10.82 
[412] 
.39 
(.11) 
21.35 
6 Pe m 3.87 
[310] 
.56 
(.21) 
10.59 4.23 
[263] 
.50 
(.13) 
10.23 3.57 
[304] 
.43 
(.16) 
8.73 
7 Pe f 6.59 
[420] 
.34 
(.08) 
10.67 7.50 
[373] 
.28 
(.05) 
10.86 6.32 
[412] 
.31 
(.06) 
10.04 
8 Pr m 3.40 
[310] 
.54 
(.25) 
9.88 3.75 
[263] 
.46 
(.15) 
9.27 2.91 
[304] 
.47 
(.25) 
8.55 
9 Pr f 4.75 
[420] 
.44 
(.15) 
10.03 6.44 
[373] 
.22 
(.04) 
9.08 4.56 
[412] 
.38 
(.12) 
9.12 
10 All y 9.74 
[348] 
.49 
(.17) 
22.97 12.52 
[300] 
.38 
(.10) 
22.78 8.67 
[336] 
.45 
(.16) 
20.82 
11 All o 8.82 
[379] 
.51 
(.18) 
22.59 10.36 
[330] 
.41 
(.10) 
21.43 7.00 
[377] 
.54 
(.20) 
21.58 
All = 0-27 point scales 
Pe, Pr = 0-12 point scales 
Pe = personal 
Pr = property 
y = young 
o = old 
m = male 
f = female 
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Table 4: Fear/Risk linear regressions (contd) 
 
 Wave 1 
(n=730) 
Wave 2 
(n=636) 
Wave 3 
(n=716) 
 
 
Inter 
-cept 
[n] 
Slope 
(r2) 
Max 
Fear 
Inter 
-cept 
[n] 
Slope 
(r2) 
Max 
Fear 
Inter 
-cept 
[n] 
Slope 
(r2) 
Max 
Fear 
12 Pe y 5.27 
[348] 
.48 
(.14) 
11.03 5.72 
[300] 
.52 
(.13) 
11.96 5.33 
[336] 
.37 
(.09) 
10.01 
13 Pe o 5.00 
[379] 
.47 
(.14) 
10.64 5.75 
[330] 
.35 
(.07) 
9.95 4.24 
[377] 
.48 
(.13) 
10.00 
14 Pr y 4.23 
[348] 
.50 
(.18) 
10.23 6.03 
[300] 
.25 
(.06) 
9.03 3.93 
[336] 
.41 
(.16) 
8.85 
15 Pr o 3.98 
[379] 
.49 
(.20) 
9.86 4.25 
[330] 
.45 
(.13) 
9.65 3.43 
[377] 
.47 
(.18) 
9.07 
16 All y m 7.74 
[133] 
.52 
(.22) 
21.78 9.31 
[103] 
.46 
(.16) 
21.73 6.21 
[123] 
.46 
(.27) 
18.63 
17 All y f 11.71 
[215] 
.42 
(.12) 
23.05 15.77 
[197] 
.23 
(.04) 
21.98 11.68 
[213] 
.33 
(.09) 
20.59 
18 Pe y m 3.96 
[133] 
.54 
(.18) 
10.44 3.99 
[103] 
.62 
(.20) 
11.43 3.66 
[123] 
.38 
(.16) 
8.22 
19 Pe y f 6.59 
[215] 
.37 
(.09) 
11.03 7.55 
[197] 
.32 
(.06) 
11.39 7.11 
[213] 
.23 
(.04) 
9.87 
20 Pr y m 3.50 
[133] 
.54 
(.21) 
9.98 4.69 
[103] 
.34 
(.09) 
8.77 2.98 
[123] 
.47 
(.27) 
8.62 
21 Pr y f 4.77 
[215] 
.46 
(.16) 
10.29 6.97 
[197] 
.17 
(.03) 
9.01 4.75 
[213] 
.34 
(.10) 
8.83 
22 All o m  6.22 
[175] 
.61 
(.31) 
22.69 7.24 
[159] 
.52 
9(.16) 
21.28 5.37 
[180] 
.54 
(.28) 
19.95 
23 All o f 12.03 
[204] 
.35 
(.09) 
21.48 14.29 
[171] 
.24 
(.04) 
20.77 9.52 
[197] 
.47 
(.14) 
22.21 
24 Pe o m  3.83 
[175] 
.56 
(.22) 
10.55 4.51 
[159] 
.40 
(.08) 
9.31 3.48 
[180] 
.47 
(.16) 
9.12 
25 Pe o f 6.58 
[204] 
.30 
(.06) 
10.18 7.36 
[171] 
.23 
(.04) 
10.12 5.37 
[197] 
.40 
(.09) 
10.17 
26 Pr o m 3.41 
[175] 
.53 
(.26) 
9.77 3.02 
[159] 
.56 
(.21) 
9.74 2.86 
[180] 
.47 
(.23) 
8.50 
27 Pr o f 4.74 
[204] 
.42 
(.13) 
9.78 5.81 
[171] 
.28 
(.06) 
9.17 4.26 
[197] 
.44 
(.14) 
9.54 
All = 0-27 point scales 
Personal, Property = 0-12 point scales 
Pe = personal 
Pr = property 
y = young 
o = old 
m = male 
f = female 
